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Abstract
We examine the response of a broad set of digital assets to US Federal Fund interest rate and quan-
titative easing announcements, specifically examining associated volatility spillover and feedback
effects. We classify each digital asset into one of three categories: Currencies; Protocols; and De-
centralised Applications (dApps). Currency-based digital assets experience idiosyncratic spillovers
in the period immediately after US monetary policy announcements, while application or protocol-
based digital assets are largely immune to policy volatility spillover and feedback. Mineable digital
assets are found to be more susceptible to monetary policy volatility spillovers and feedback than
non-mineable. Responses indicate a diverse market within which, not all assets are comparable to
Bitcoin.
Keywords: Cryptocurrencies; Digital Assets; GARCH; Volatility Spillovers; Monetary Policy.
1. Introduction
Bitcoin is proposed as a decentralised currency requiring no third-party involvement, and inde-
pendent of central banks and governments. Despite the current position of Bitcoin as the cryptocur-
rency market leader, it will experience increased competition in the near future, as the blockchain
space matures. A number of studies suggest that legitimate challengers to Bitcoin will emerge (Fry
and Cheah [2016]). The majority of research has focused solely on Bitcoin, with various other
alternative-coins being relatively ignored, however, there has been a recent emergence of significant
competitors to Bitcoin (for example, Ethereum and Litecoin) and this will only continue to increase
as cryptocurrencies with improved technology and increased efficiency (such as EOS, Tezos and
Factom) continue to emerge. The creation of new blockchain protocols looks set to surpass Bitcoin
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as the sole major cryptocurrency, and it has already been noted that the emergence of such coins
has a negative impact of the growth of Bitcoin.
The current internet stack is comprised of a number of shared protocols (such as HTTP, TCP
and SMTP) on top of which an application layer is built. The application layer is comprised of the
centralised web applications that make up the Internet as we know it (utilised by online services such
as Gmail, Facebook and Airbnb). Although consumers and end-users are typically only familiar
with the end applications, such applications and indeed the whole internet, would not be possible
without these underlying protocols. Lower-level protocols will be necessary to provide infrastructure
that will allow user-friendly decentralised applications to be built. Financial cryptocurrencies that
are intended solely for the transfer of wealth and to be used as payments systems, are just one of the
possible applications on the top layer of the blockchain stack. While previous studies have primarily
focused on Bitcoin itself, the emergence of blockchain-based tokens necessitates further study to
determine the key differentials between these different forms of tokens, and to assess whether they
react differently to the market. We observe a distinct difference between the two layers described as
protocols and applications. Our research aims to quantify this theoretical difference by measuring
their respective reactions to fiat money monetary policy (i.e. monetary policy related to financial
instruments related to a denominated legal tender as defined in law by national and supranational
governments).
We note key differences among application layer tokens themselves, and the large number of
varying forms that currently exist. As currency based tokens currently dominate and account for
most of the current market, in terms of market cap and public awareness, it is appropriate to denote
these tokens as a separate asset class. Having classified currency based digital assets as their own
category, we view all other applications in the top layer as one category. As the digital assets market
is currently at a very early stage of development, it is likely that these categories and classifications
will change as new use cases are developed. We aim to differentiate between assets used at the
bottom layer of infrastructure, that will primarily be of use to developers over the coming years,
and top layer applications that will be intended for use by the wider public. Again, with regard to
these applications, we differentiate between those that are intended for use primarily as currency
and financial transfer and those that have any other use case. We classify each digital asset in one
of three categories:
1. Currencies: Digital assets whose primary (and in most cases, only) use is that of financial
payment or monetary transfer.
2. Blockchains/Protocols: Digital assets whose primary usage is that of a blockchain platform,
or protocol, on which other applications can be built.
3. Decentralised Applications (dApps): Applications combining a user interface, and a decen-
tralised back−end, built upon an already existing blockchain.
Using a range of GARCH-family methodologies, we examine the interlinkages of individual
digital assets to US monetary policy changes, in the form of interest rate and quantitative easing
(QE) announcements. We identify volatility spillover transfers between these policy changes and
the digital assets market as a whole, before dividing our sample into three, separated by type of
cryptocurrency (Currency, Protocol and dApp) and re-examining volatility spillover transfer to
each of the three categories. We examine the differing reaction between mineable and non-mineable
assets, before using a second-stage GARCH model to identify any changes in volatility spillover
characteristics as the digital assets market matures. It is important to determine whether there
exists traditional volatility spillover channels between broad financial markets and this new asset
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class. We observe a statistically significant differentiation between applications, and the protocols
upon which they are built. We find evidence of volatility spillover transfer from US monetary
policy announcements to Currency-based digital assets. In contrast, Application or Protocol-based
digital assets remained largely immune to policy spillover transfer. Additionally, we find evidence
to suggest that mineable digital assets are more susceptible to monetary policy volatility spillovers
transfer than non-mineable. We also find evidence to suggest that Currencies experience a positive
increase in global systematic volatility spillovers (following a monetary policy announcement) while
Protocols experience a decrease. dApps remain immune to any global systematic volatility spillover
transfer, throughout our sample.
2. Previous Literature
Cryptocurrency research has developed across a broad number of areas, with specific emphasis
on pricing inefficiencies (Sensoy [2019], Corbet et al. [2019]), to be in isolation from other traded
assets (Corbet et al. [2018]), to present evidence of price clustering (Urquhart [2017]), pricing
bubbles (Corbet et al. [2018]), regulatory ambiguity (Fry [2018]), and exceptional levels of both
complex and uncomplex fraud (Gandal et al. [2018]). Although development and innovation within
financial markets is of course associated with some risk, due to the exceptional number of relatively
illicit activity within the product’s pricing, trading techniques and indeed the exchanges on which it
trades, the product’s development has continued at pace, despite the exceptional pricing volatility
that has taken place (Katsiampa et al. [2019a]; Katsiampa et al. [2019b]; Celeste et al. [2019]).
Due to the relative youth of cryptocurrency markets, we must draw on a number of sources of prior
research that focus on broad symptoms of market stress. Berger and Bouwman [2017] examined the
interplay among bank liquidity creation, monetary policy, and financial crises, where results suggest
that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps
lessen the likelihood of financial crises. Christopoulos and Jarrow [2018] investigated CMBS market
efficiency during and after the credit crisis with a comprehensive loan, bond and deal level data
set, while Yoldas and Senyuz [2018] constructed models that incorporate the long-run equilibrium
relationship between term Libor and OIS rates and their regime-dependent dynamics to find strong
evidence for three regimes in the inter-bank funding market that resemble different pricing of risk
and equilibrium outcomes. Development of policy and regulatory solutions to issues relating to
volatility and interactions in such maturing markets are central to the development of policy (such
as that of Mester [2017]; Krainer [2017]; and Gertler and Horvath [2018]) from which cryptocurrency
markets can further progress. Evidence of such market maturity has been identified in works such
as that of Akyildirim et al. [2019], who found that there have been broad, significant pricing
effects sourced from both fraudulent and regulatory unease within the cryptocurrency industry.
A concise overview of associated cryptocurrency literature was developed by Corbet et al. [2019].
Our work delves deeper into the specific questions surrounding the differences in behaviour with
regards to sub-categories of cryptocurrencies. Eken and Baloglu [2017] compared the development
of cryptocurrency markets with other currency types that were in use in different periods of history.
Dwyer [2015] provides an explanation of the way in which digital currencies, such as Bitcoin, use
peer-to-peer networks to overcome the double-spending problem, referring to an error in a digital
cash scheme in which the same single digital token is spent more than once1. This is possible because
1In decentralised systems, by 2007, a number of distributed systems for double-spending prevention had been
proposed. Bitcoin implemented a solution in early 2009, using a scheme called ‘proof-of-work’, to avoid the need
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a digital token consists of a digital file that can be duplicated or falsified. As with counterfeit money,
such double-spending leads to inflation by creating a new amount of fraudulent currency that did
not previously exist. This devalues the currency relative to other monetary units, and diminishes
user trust as well as the circulation and retention of the currency2.
Böhme et al. [2015] provide a detailed description of the technology behind Bitcoin, including the
blockchain, mining, mining pools, transaction fees and wallets. The authors also detail the early use
cases of Bitcoin, areas of risk involved, and examine the potential for future regulation. Kroll et al.
[2013] examine the economics of Bitcoin mining and mining strategy, in particular, its resilience to
potential attacks. The authors observe the presence of a Nash equilibrium which requires players to
reach a consensus on three key factors: 1)The rules: how to determine a valid transaction; 2) The
state: an agreement on the history of the blockchain; and 3) The value of Bitcoin (participants must
be in agreement that Bitcoin is inherently valuable). The authors highlight Bitcoin’s vulnerability
to various potential attacks, including a ‘51%’ attack (an attack by a participant who controls
more than 51% of the network power) and a Goldfinger attack (an attack motivated by a desire
to disrupt the system, due to an outside incentive. Potential attackers include: law enforcement, a
holder of a short position and protesters).
There have been multiple pieces of research that utilise GARCH-family methodologies to specif-
ically investigate cryptocurrency pricing behaviour. Gronwald [2014] analyse Bitcoin pricing be-
haviour, identifying that Jump (ARJI) GARCH models are found to outperform GARCH(1,1)
models, finding evidence that cryptocurrency markets are behaving in a very immature manner
when compared to traditional markets. Risteski and Davcev [2014] extended the conventional
EGARCH model with modification through the addition of Search Volume Index (EGARCH-SVI)
as measured by Google Trends data. Brandvold et al. [2015] examine the varying price of Bitcoin
among different exchanges and the contribution of these exchanges to price discovery. Mt Gox and
Btc-e are found to be the price leaders. Smaller exchanges are found to provide the market with
less information, and usually follow the market with a lag. Akyildirim et al. [2019] identified the
existence of time-varying positive interrelationships between the conditional correlations of cryp-
tocurrencies and financial market stress when analysing the relationship between the price volatility
of a broad range of cryptocurrencies and the VIX and VSTOXX respectively. Bouoiyour and Selmi
[2016] examined the 2016 decline in the volatility of Bitcoin and ask whether this is an indication
that the Bitcoin market is maturing. Using multiple-threshold and asymmetric-power GARCH
models, the authors compare returns over two periods (2010-2014 and 2015-2016). The authors
determine 2010-2014 to have been an ‘explosive process’ and observe Bitcoin volatility persistence
to have fallen in 2015. In addition, the authors find Bitcoin prices to be asymmetrically driven.
Bariviera et al. [2017] compare dynamics of Bitcoin and traditional currency returns. The authors
focus on the long-range memory of returns and find Bitcoin volatility to be reducing over time.
for a trusted third party to time-stamp transactions. These time-stamps are recorded in its public ledger called the
blockchain, therefore it avoids double-spending of the currency. The use of this method, combined with a limitation
of supply, leads to an equilibrium. Additionally, the author notes the rise of 24/7 online trading markets without
the need for any brokers or agents and determines Bitcoin to have a comparative advantage over traditional fiat
currencies, due to the low associated transactions costs and the potential for avoidance of government currency
controls
2Fundamental cryptographic techniques to prevent double-spending while preserving anonymity in a transaction
are blind signatures and particularly in off-line systems. In centralised systems, this is usually implemented using an
on-line central trusted third party that can verify whether a token has been spent. This normally represents a single
point of failure from both availability and trust viewpoints.
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Additionally, Bitcoin dynamics are found to have changed over time and, using the Hurst exponent,
Bitcoin is found to have stabilised in recent years.
Analysis of the volatility behaviour of these products is vital when considering the broad range of
pricing anomalies and bubble-like pricing behaviour that has been supported with evidence. Cheah
and Fry [2015] test for evidence of speculative bubbles in Bitcoin returns, using two assumptions for
intrinsic rate of return and intrinsic level of risk. The authors find evidence to suggest that Bitcoin
prices are prone to substantial bubbles. In addition, they empirically estimate the value of Bitcoin to
be zero. Urquhart [2017] measures the efficiency of Bitcoin returns over a six-year period (between
August 2010 and July 2016) using a number of tests for randomness (Ljung-Box, Runs, Bartels,
Automatic variance test, BDS, R/S Hurst tests), finding that returns are significantly inefficient
over the entire sample. When divided into two equal sub-samples, two tests indicate efficiency
of returns in the latter sample, suggesting that Bitcoin may be moving towards becoming more
efficient. Nadarajah and Chu [2017] elaborate on this study by using a power transformation of
the same returns used by Urquhart [2017], without any loss of information. Having performed this
transformation, returns displayed evidence of weak efficiency over both the entire sample, and both
sub-samples. Cheung et al. [2015] perform an econometric investigation of bubbles in the Bitcoin
market, using the Phillips et al. [2015] methodology (a technique which has proven to be robust
in detecting bubbles). Using this method, the authors detect a number of short-lived bubbles, and
three large bubbles lasting from 66 to 106 days. The bursting of these bubbles is found to coincide
with a number of major events that occurred in the Bitcoin market, the most significant of these
leading to the demise of the Mt. Gox exchange (as a result of the Chinese ban and the theft of a
large amount of Bitcoin). Further evidence has identified the presence of substantial bubbles in a
range of cryptocurrency markets (Corbet et al. [2018]; Fry [2018]).
3. Blockchain Positioning
Blockchain based cryptocurrencies are protected by Merkel Trees, a cryptographic method that
prevents the blockchain from being altered, once a block has been confirmed (the more subsequent
blocks that are added, the harder it becomes to alter previous blocks). A blockchain consists of a
series of data packets, intrinsically linked to one another, known as blocks. Each block is added to
the chain by a series of computations completed by a network of users. Each block is added to the
existing chain, in such a way that it becomes near impossible to alter the data that has been entered
in previous blocks. This enables transactions, and other data, to be stored online, and enables users
to have full confidence that the data cannot be tampered with, or changed, at a later date. Such
a system allows peer-to-peer monetary transactions to become possible online, by overcoming the
previously insurmountable double-spending problem.
Traditional fiat currency, gold, and other stores of value derive value due to their scarcity. For
digital currencies to possess value, they must be scare, a shortcoming of all previous attempts
at creating digital currencies. The mining process creates, and ensures scarcity. Thousands of
copies of the blockchain are stored and run on computers around the world, known as nodes.
All transactions that occur within the network are recorded, and kept track of, in a ledger (the
blockchain). Previously, it would fall upon central banks to maintain the ledger, and ensure that
no egregious changes, or forgeries. are made. As opposed to centralised banks maintaining control
of the ledger, as is the case with traditional fiat currencies, the ledger is maintained by each of
the nodes. Nodes communicate with each other to determine what the correct form of the ledger
is. Consensus is arrived at, between these nodes, as to which copy of the ledger is the correct
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one and, as a result, the need for a centralised third-party validator is removed. Full nodes verify
and maintain the ledger, in exchange for economic incentives: miner rewards and transaction fees.
Nodes compete with each other, in an attempt to solve a complex mathematical problem, which
allows for the confirmation of the next block onto the chain. Miners allocate resources, in the form
of computing power, to this pursuit, in the hope of receiving a block reward (a payment of Bitcoin
to the first node to arrive at the correct solution to the mathematical problem). Digital assets
derive their value, and the scarcity necessary for value, from this mining process. Digital assets can
be stored using a variety of methods: online wallets, online exchanges, hardware wallets and paper
wallets (cold storage) being just a selection of the possible storage methods.
Smart contracts enable the transfer of traditional real-world agreements, onto the blockchain, so
that they can be executed online - without the need for a third-party enforcement agent. Smart con-
tracts are computer protocols, intended to facilitate, verify or enforce the negotiation or performance
of a contract. Smart contracts define the rules and requirements around a proposed agreement, in
the same way that a traditional contract does, however, the smart contract automatically enforces
the obligations, removing the need for a trusted third-party.
Insert Table 1 about here
The protocol layers that enable, and define, internet communication are collectively referred to as
the internet protocol stack. Figure 1 presents an illustration of the TCP/IP stack. The lowest, link
layer, allows for the transfer of data packets between different hosts on a local network. Hardware
protocols such as Ethernet allow for the transfer of data over LANs (Local Access Networks),
although the TCP/IP protocol can be implemented on top of almost any hardware. The internet
layer allows these data packets to be sent across multiple networks through a routing process.
Internet layer protocols such as IP (Internet Protocol) carry data for a number of upper-layer
protocols. The transport layer allows for end-to-end communication across a network between
application processes running on different networks. Such communication is facilitated through
a connection-orientated protocol such as TCP (Transmission Control Protocol). The application
layer consists of the necessary protocols - such as HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) and SMTP
(Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) - required for common applications to send and receive application
data across the lower level protocols, enabling it to provide a service for the user. The combination
of these layers is referred to as the protocol layer, and is the necessary foundation that common
web applications such as Gmail and Google are built upon. The blockchain market and ecosystem
should be viewed in the same manner, not as a series of individual currencies, but as a blockchain
stack. Cryptocurrencies are frequently viewed by investors as one and the same, but there are large
differences between the various categories that these cryptocurrencies fall under. In the same way
that Gmail is a single application of the entire Internet stack, and the protocols that underlie it,
Bitcoin is a single use of its underling protocol, the blockchain. Blockchains enable the transfer and
sharing of data to take place in a decentralised, and transparent, manner. These blockchains should
be viewed similarly to HTTP and TCP - as the bottom layer of the blockchain stack. Only once
these protocol layers have been sufficiently developed, can user-friendly applications be built upon
them. Contrary to public opinion, the blockchain‘s use is not limited to purely facilitating financial
transfers and transactions. Blockchains enable the transfer of data, and so, allow a number of
possible use cases to be built upon them. Such uses include, file and data sharing (IPFS, Filecoin),
decentralised super-computers (Golem), and the execution of smart contracts, first demonstrated by
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Ethereum. As such, it would be inappropriate, and incorrect, to compare and contrast all tradeable
tokens in the digital asset market, with Bitcoin. Bitcoin is merely a single use case of a much wider
market. A visual representation of a potential blockchain stack is also provided in Figure 1.
The current digital assets market currently consists of a number of tokens from both the protocol
and application layers of the blockchain stack - a dynamic not previously observed in the early days
of the internet. Such a dynamic is created due to the newfound ability of blockchain protocols to
create wealth. Shared internet protocols such as TCP/HTTP are essential to the modern internet,
however they generate no value for users and it falls upon the top-end applications to do so. In
the case of the blockchain stack, low-level protocols such as Ethereum, can be monetised - through
the creation of a token - and so, are capable of generating wealth. As illustrated by Figure 1, these
protocols will be capable of generating large amounts of wealth, as they are an essential component
of every top-level application built upon them. As such, we consider it incorrect to view the digital
assets market as one entity - similar and comparable to Bitcoin - and instead, suggest that assets
should be evaluated based on their position within the blockchain stack.
1. Currencies: The most notable, and widely used, digital asset is Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a peer-to-
peer digital asset, which claims to be decentralised and independent of monetary authority
influence, created by Satoshi Nakamoto (Nakamoto [2008]). Transactions take place directly
between users, and are verified by network nodes. To overcome the traditional ‘double-
spending’ problem, each transaction must be cryptographically verified by a network node,
or ‘miner’. Kroll et al. [2013], provides a detailed description of the mining process). Miners
add verified transactions to a publicly distributed ledger, or blockchain, and are incentivised
to do so by the reward of transaction fees and new bitcoins. New bitcoins are created every
10 minutes, via this mining process, and will continue to do so until the full supply, of 21
million bitcoins, has been issued. In this way, unlike traditional FIAT currencies, Bitcoin is a
deflationary asset. As the digital assets market has expanded, a number of other peer-to-peer
currencies have emerged. Some have made minor adjustments and changes to the original
Bitcoin source code, while others have created an entirely new asset. Alternative coins, or
altcoins, typically aim to improve upon Bitcoin in areas such as privacy, transaction speed
and cryptographic proof method. We define any digital asset who‘s primary function is that
of a medium of exchange or transfer of value, as a Currency.
2. Protocols: We define a protocol as a set of rules governing the transfer of data across networks.
Figure 1 contains a number of examples of internet protocols including: Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP), the underlying protocol of the World Wide Web defining how messages
are formatted and transmitted; HTTP Secure (HTTPS), a communications protocol used
for secure communication over networks; and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) a communications
security protocol commonly used in email. Unlike Currencies, we define blockchain Protocols
as digital assets whose primary function will be that of data transfer, and provide a bottom
layer on which to build decentralised applications. When categorising the digital assets in our
sample, we include any platform, blockchain or method for data transfer, upon which other
applications could feasibly be built, in our definition of the term ‘protocol’.
3. Decentralised Applications (dApps): The term decentralised application (dApp) refers to any
application whose back-end code runs on a decentralised peer-to-peer network. This con-
trasts with traditional applications, whose back-end code is usually executed on a centralised
server. dApps typically consist of front-end code and user interfaces written in a traditional
programming language, and back-end code executed on a blockchain - typically in the form of
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smart contracts. For the purposes of this study, we define dApps as any decentralised appli-
cation built upon a blockchain or platform, whose primary purpose is not that of currency or
monetary transfer. Examples of blockchain dApps include decentralised storage applications,
insurance applications, and decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs).
We define a digital asset as any asset in binary format owned by an individual. For the purpose
of this study, we collectively refer to the combination of cryptocurrencies, blockchain platforms,
protocols and decentralised applications contained in our sample, as digital assets. A coin such as
Bitcoin, is a single application built upon its underlying blockchain. A protocol such as Ethereum
allows smart contracts to be executed upon its blockchain, and in doing so, allows decentralised
applications to be built upon it. Any application built upon a blockchain, is intrinsically linked
with that blockchain. A token issued upon the Ethereum blockchain (referred to as an ERC-20
token) requires Ether to execute the smart contracts that allow this token/application to function.
In this way, as the token grows, so does the underlying protocol, and any wealth generated at the
application layer, is distributed not only among its own token holders, but back to the underlying
protocol itself. As such, Ethereum token holders benefit not only from the growth of Ethereum, but
from the growth of any application built upon the platform - as a growth in the token, inherently
causes the platform itself to grow. As such, when attempting to price or economically analyse such
assets, it would be inappropriate to compare a token with the blockchain that token itself is built
upon, the two should be viewed as entirely different classes of asset.
4. Data and Methodology
4.1. Data
Unlike traditional equities and commodities, digital assets are traded on a number of exchanges;
as such, closing prices can vary depending on the exchange used to source the data. Data is obtained
from www.coinmarketcap.com, where closing prices are constructed using a weighted combination
of closing prices from all exchanges on which the asset is traded.
Insert Table 1 about here
We source daily closing prices for all assets, and exclude any assets that provide less than 90
days of observations, leaving us with a remaining 58 digital assets in our sample displayed in Table
1. We use the US nominal broad dollar index, a trade-weighted index used to measure the value
of the dollar, relative to other world currencies to represent a global currency factor. We identify
Bitcoin as the market leader among digital assets. Due to its large market capitalisation, relatively
stable price, and high level of trust and reputation among users as the market leader, we use Bitcoin
returns as a proxy for a domestic (US) currency factor. We refer to each variable in our sample
(digital assets and currency pairs) as an asset.
Insert Table 2 about here
We aim to examine the reaction of each asset in our sample to US policy announcements. To do
this, we construct a database of US policy changes between the 26th April 2013 and the 30th June
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2017. Our announcement database consists of eight interest rate changes and quantitative easing
(QE) announcements made by the US Federal Market Open Committee, between May 2013 and
June 2017, and is presented in Table 2. We denote the 50 days following the announcement of an
interest rate or QE change, as the announcement period.
Insert Table 3 about here
We sort our sample by type of cryptocurrency, denoted as either a Currency, Protocol or Decen-
tralised Application (dApp), based on the definitions provided in previous sections of this paper.
To summarise: we denote a Currency as any digital asset whose primary use is monetary payments,
currency related, or a store of financial value. We denote a Protocol as any digital asset whose pri-
mary function is that of a blockchain protocol or platform. We denote a dApp, as any third-party
application, with a primary function other than currency, built on an existing blockchain.
4.2. Methodology
We note the presence of heteroscedasticity and volatility persistence (Andersen and Bollerslev
[1997]) in our returns data. When testing for contagion and volatility spillovers, methods which do
not correct for heteroscedasticity are found to be biased (Forbes and Rigobon [2002]) - such tests will
overstate any increases in market volatility, and the magnitude of cross-market relationships. As
such, non-heteroskedastic adjusting tests may incorrectly suggest that volatility spillovers have oc-
curred. To account for this, we implement a variation of the generalised autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) based approach (Edwards [1998] and Engle et al. [1990]). Specifi-
cally, we use the exponential generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (EGARCH)
model, as it allows for asymmetric effects between positive and negative returns. After completing
the standard robustness tests the EGARCH(1,1) methodology, for the most part, was selected as
the appropriate model to test for changes in volatility3. Where necessary, we display the results of
the best-fitting methodology as determined by the selection criteria4 displayed in Table 3. Models
that incorporate volatility asymmetries, or negative correlations between returns and volatility in-
novations, generally outperform models that do not. Further, the EGARCH methodology exploits
information contained in realised measures of volatility while providing a flexible leverage function
that accounts for return-volatility dependence while remaining in a GARCH-like modelling frame-
work and estimation convenience, the model allows independent return and volatility shock and
this dual shock nature leaves a room for the establishment of a variance risk premium. We estimate
the standard market model as follows:
ri,t = a0,i + a1,if
global
t + εi,t (1)
3We considered the use of GARCH, Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) and GJR-GARCH, but EGARCH was found
to outperform each methodology. Results are available from the authors on request. An intercept and a deterministic
trend were included in the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron (PP) models. The trend was included
to capture the reduction in average volatility that took place during the period analysed. The ADF model tests
whether the equity series contain a unit root in order to correct for serial correlation. PP tests employ a non-
parametric estimator of the variance-covariance matrix with d truncation lags. The models test down by sequentially
removing the last lag until a significant lag is reached giving the order of augmentation for the ADF test that
minimised the Akaike information criterion. The results indicated rejected of the null-unit root hypotheses at a
minimum of the 5 per cent level
4Results for all methodological calculations are available from the authors on request.
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where fglobal represents the global currency factor in the form of the US broad dollar index,
representing the common shock to all currencies. a(1,i) is a measure of global systematic risk
exposure for asset i. r(i,t) represents the return of asset i at time t. To identify systematic volatility
spillovers, we extend specification (1) as follows:




t It + εi,t (2)
It takes the value 1 during an announcement period, and 0 during all other periods. a2,j there-
fore, is a measure of the change in systematic risk exposure following the interest rate announcement,
and can be used to represent systematic volatility spillovers. To capture both idiosyncratic and shift
volatility spillovers, we extend the specification as follows:








t It + ξi,t; (3)
where, j = 1, ......, n − 1 6= US. fBTCt represents the US domestic currency factor, proxied
by Bitcoin returns. b1,j represents a standard CAPM beta coefficient against global markets. b2,j
represents systemic volatility spillovers (as previously discussed). b3,j measures any spillover effects
that occur as a result of shocks emanating from the interest rate announcement. b4,j is a measure
of the change in spillover effects that occurred solely during an announcement period. These
additional spillover effects then, can be used to denote idiosyncratic volatility effects. b5,j captures
any intercept shift in the model that occurred during the announcement period, and is used to
represent shift volatility spillovers. We express the variance equation of our EGARCH model as
follows:









We use the following variance equation to capture the volatility spillover effects emanating from
the US, which we use to identify volatility volatility spillover:
ln(σ2j,t) = c0,j + c1,j(|Zi,t−1| − E |Zi,t−1) + c2,jzj,t−1 + c3,j ln(σ2j,t−1)
+ π1,j ln(σ
2
BTC,t) + π2,j ln(σ
2
BTC,t)I1,t + π3,j ln(σ
2
BTC,t)I2,t
where; j = 1, ......, n− 1 6= BTC
(5)
π1,j represents general US volatility spillover, over the entire sample period. π2,j measures
the US volatility spillover that occurred during the announcement period itself. This measure of
additional volatility spillover is used to represent volatility driven spillover.
5. Results
5.1. Volatility spillover and feedback effects
Using our previously outlined methodology, we find significant evidence of volatility spillover
transfers from US monetary policy announcements, to the digital asset market. With the exception
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of four, relatively small-cap currencies, all other digital assets in our sample exhibit statistically
significant evidence of exposure to global systematic risk during the sample period. The four
exceptions (Gulden, ReddCoin, Xaurum and CloakCoin) are all relatively small-cap assets, and
are all classified as Currencies (Gulden, ReddCoin and CloakCoin are all used for payments, while
Xaurum represents a store, or unit, of value).
A digital asset‘s change in exposure to global systematic risk, as a result of the monetary policy
announcement, is represented by the coefficient b2. An increase in exposure to global systematic
risk, in the period following the policy announcements, indicates systematic volatility spillover gen-
erated solely by the monetary policy announcement. All digital assets which experienced exposure
to systematic volatility spillover were either Currencies or Protocols. We observe no evidence of
systematic volatility spillover in any of the dApps in our sample. A total of twelve digital assets
experienced systematic volatility spillover exposure. Of this total, seven experienced a significant
increase in systematic volatility spillover, while five experienced a significant decrease. The seven
digital assets which experienced an increase (Bytecoin, BitcoinDark, Burst, Leocoin, Monacoin,
ReddCoin and Stellar Lumens) are all classified as Currencies. Four of the five assets which expe-
rienced a decrease (AntShares, Ethereum, NXT and Stratis) were classified as Protocols. Peercoin
is the only currency in our sample to have experienced a significant increase in global systematic
volatility spillovers. Of the five assets which displayed evidence of negative exposure to global
systematic volatility spillovers, all five had previously displayed positive exposure with the global
market, prior to the monetary policy announcements.
The unreported coefficient, b3, represents the general spillover effects Masson [1999] that em-
anate from the domestic cryptocurrency market, represented by Bitcoin (BTC). The coefficient
b4 then, represents the additional BTC spillovers that occurred, following each monetary policy
announcement, and we denote this effect as idiosyncratic volatility spillover. Almost all of the
assets in our sample displayed evidence of exposure to idiosyncratic volatility spillover (82%). The
ten assets which display no evidence of such spillovers (AntShares, Mona, Synero, PivX, Status,
Monero, Verge, ReddCoin, Cloak and NEM) are a combination of all three classifications of asset.
Only Ethereum and Bytecoin display a negative, statistically significant, idiosyncratic spillover co-
efficient. The presence of shift volatility spillover is represented by the coefficient b5. Almost half
(47%) of our sample experienced shift volatility spillover. Of the assets to have experienced shift
volatility spillover, fifteen were Currencies, eight Protocols and five dApps.
Insert Table 4 about here
As illustrated in Table 4, exactly half of the digital assets in our sample (29) exhibited some
form of US monetary policy generated volatility spillovers. A small group of four digital assets
(CloakCoin, EarthCoin, Syscoin and NEM) exhibit volatility spillover effects that were driven
by volatility spillovers. Three of these assets are relatively small assets, with the exception of
NEM, a large-cap protocol (market capitalisation of $1.7 billion, the sixth largest in our sample).
A small group of five assets (Agoras Tokens, Gulden, ReddCoin, Xaurum and Stellar Lumens)
display evidence of effects that were primarily driven by systematic volatility spillovers. With the
exception of Agoras, the remainder are all classified as a Currency. Again, the majority of the
assets are relatively small-cap, excluding Stellar Lumens ($286 million market capitalisation, the
26th largest). Ten assets display evidence of spillover effects that were driven by idiosyncratic
shocks. This group is primarily comprised of Currencies, indicating that it was this category which
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was most likely to experience the effects of monetary policy generated shocks. Additionally, this
group features a number of the largest assets in our sample (Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dash) suggesting
that, as a digital asset which is primarily used for financial payments and monetary transfers
becomes larger, it becomes more exposed to traditional currency monetary policy announcements.
A further ten assets experienced multiple drivers of volatility spillovers. Again, the list is primarily
comprised of Currencies and Protocols. Notably, Ethereum (a Protocol, and the second largest
market-cap in our sample) displays evidence of such exposure to multiple forms of spillovers. The
lack of any dApps on this list is notable, and the fact that only two in total experience volatility
spillover driven effects of any kind, suggests that this category remains predominantly immune to
US monetary policy effects.
A total of 76% of Currencies in our sample experienced some form of volatility spillover. When
compared with the presence of Protocols which experienced a form of spillover transfer (40%), it
is clear that digital assets which are primarily used for monetary transfer and financial services,
are more susceptible to US monetary policy volatility spillovers transfer. The fact that only 20%
of the dApps in our sample experience any form of volatility transfer, suggests that this category
of assets remain immune to traditional currency monetary policy effects. Having examined the
volatility spillover responses of our entire sample to policy decisions, we now segregate our sample
based on 1) category and 2) whether the digital asset is mineable or not. After separating by type
of cryptocurrency, we re-estimate our results using the same methodology contained in the previous
section.
5.2. Behavioural differences between currencies, protocols and dApps
The three groups of cryptocurrencies contain 28, 20 and 10 digital assets, respectively. All
three categories display evidence of positive exposure to global systematic risk, confirming the pre-
vious sections result, and indicating that digital assets, as a whole, are subject to global market
risk exposure. While a number of individual assets experienced exposure to systematic volatility
spillovers, once separated into groups, none of the three categories display significant evidence of
such exposure. The fact that affected individual assets are all predominately large-cap suggests
that, as an asset‘s market capitalisation increases, it becomes significantly exposed to global sys-
tematic spillovers, while the digital asset market as a whole remains mostly immune. Whether or
not this increased exposure is positive or negative depends on the category of asset. The previously
identified split between positively and negatively exposed assets, dependent on their being Curren-
cies or Protocols, suggests that, as a Currency increases in market cap, it become more exposed to
systematic volatility spillovers, while Protocol layer assets will experience reduced exposure.
Idiosyncratic volatility spillovers are found to be positive, and statistically significant, in both the
Currency and dApps groupings. The Protocol cohort displays no significant evidence of exposure
to this form of spillover. Having previously presented evidence of idiosyncratic spillover in 82% of
the total sample, this becomes an important result. Protocol level digital assets clearly display a
reduced propensity for idiosyncratic volatility spillover exposure, when compared with other assets
in the market. This finding is a notable contribution to the quickly expanding area of digital assets
and cryptocurrencies and confirms, for the first time, that all digital assets should not be viewed as
having similar market characteristics. Digital assets, in fact, react differently to traditional markets
and policy announcements, based on the specific use of the asset. Digital assets have largely been
compared to, and associated with Bitcoin, due to their relative complexity and the lack of research
on the area. The fact that Protocol layer digital assets remain immune to US monetary policy
spillovers confirms that each asset should be evaluated and valued based on its own individual use,
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rather than be viewed as one entire ‘Bitcoin-like’ market. Having previously identified exposure
to shift spillovers in half the total sample, the presence of positive and significant exposure to
shift spillovers, in each of the three groups, confirms that this form of volatility spillover is evenly
distributed amongst all forms of asset.
Insert Table 5 about here
As further illustrated by the parameter results in table 5, just one of the three cohorts displays
evidence of volatility spillover effects that were driven by US monetary policy announcements. Cur-
rency volatility spillover effects are shown to be driven by idiosyncratic shocks, a result which is
consistent with the findings of Section 4, in which the group of individual assets to be idiosyn-
cratically driven, consists predominantly of larger-cap Currencies. Neither Protocols nor dApps
displayed evidence of having any volatility driven effects, a result which is also consistent with
earlier presented findings. Just 40% of individual Protocols, and an even smaller 20% of dApps,
displayed evidence of having some form of US policy driven spillover effects. Neither of these groups
displays significant evidence of such spillover driven effects, indicates that they remain largely im-
mune, and considerably less effected, when compared to Currencies. This result is both significant,
and intuitive, suggesting that digital assets whose primary purpose is that of fiscal use and financial
transfer, are susceptible to the same US monetary policy generated market volatility spillovers as
traditional currencies, while digital assets created for other purposes, remain immune to such policy
measures.
5.3. Behavioural differences between mineable and non-mineable assets
We further divide our entire sample into two additional cohorts: assets which are mineable,
and those which are not. The two groups contain 30 and 28 digital assets, respectively. We note
significant differences between the two groups with regard to the b1, b2 and b4 coefficients. In
Table 6, we observe that mineable assets display evidence of significant positive exposure to global
systematic risk, consistent with our results from both previous models. However, non-mineable
assets are shown to be an exception to this rule, and display no significant evidence of exposure to
such risk.
Insert Table 6 about here
In the case of exposure to systematic volatility spillovers, mineable assets display a negatively
significant change in systematic risk exposure following policy announcements, indicating exposure
to systematic spillovers. Again, in contrast, non-mineable assets show no such evidence of expo-
sure. We previously noted a lack of significant systematic volatility spillovers in any of the three
categories, however, when viewed individually we noted that a number of currencies and protocols
experienced a significant increase or decrease in this form of spillover exposure. This observation is
explained by the increased likelihood of a Currency or dApp being mineable, when compared to a
Protocol or blockchain itself. In the case of the original twelve assets that experienced systematic
exposure - seven were mineable assets. Such results clearly highlight and confirm an increased
propensity for systematic volatility spillover exposure in mineable assets. The b4 coefficient, rep-
resenting additional BTC spillovers that occurred following a policy announcement, is found to be
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significant, and negative, in the case of the group of mineable assets. Once again, we observe a
non-significant coefficient in the case of the non-mineable group, indicating a lack of idiosyncratic
volatility spillovers. As previously observed, both Currency and dApp cohorts shared this same
volatility spillover characteristic, while idiosyncratic volatility spillovers were absent in the Proto-
col grouping. As we have previously identified, Protocols are more likely to be non-mineable, while
Currencies are typical mined. These results are consistent with this early finding, and further con-
firm the increased likelihood of idiosyncratic volatility transfers in mineable assets, and a reduced
propensity in Protocols.
Shift volatility spillovers is found to be both significant and positive, in both portfolios, further
confirming the assertion that this form of volatility spillover is evenly distributed amongst all forms
of asset, irrespective of category or mining status. As illustrated in table 6, both groups display
evidence of volatility spillovers that were driven by US monetary policy announcements. Mineable
assets are shown to be driven by multiple forms of volatility spillovers, while Non-Mineable assets
are primarily volatility driven. The fact that neither grouping is driven by idiosyncratic volatility
spillovers is surprising, when the previous section‘s results are considered. Multiple spillovers was
found to be the driving form of volatility spillover for just 17% of individual assets. volatility-driven
spillovers accounted for an even smaller figure of just 7%. Additionally, idiosyncratic spillovers were
found to be the primary driver of spillover effects in the Currency grouping.
6. Robustness Testing
Having previously subjected our analysis to a number of robustness checks based on groups
denoted by both asset category and mining status - we further analyse our sample by sub-dividing it
into a number of phases, and re-estimating the results. Such an approach has been used successfully
in previous studies by Claessens et al. [2010]; Dungey and Gajurel [2015] and Corbet and Larkin
[2017]. From our total sample of eight policy announcements (Table 2), we note that the first four
were focused on a quantitative easing announcement or change, while the remaining four centred
on an interest rate increase. The four QE announcements were made over a period of seventeen
months spanning from 22 May 2013 to 29 October 2014, while the interest rate changes were made
over a period of eighteen months, from 17 December 2015 to 15 June 2017. We divide our entire
sample into two periods, based on these two date ranges, and label the QE announcement range
Period I and the interest rate range Period II. The results are displayed in Table 7. The breaking of
our entire sample provides an opportunity to differentiate between the early stages of the market,
and the changes that have occurred as the market matures. Such a method is in line with the
work of Bouoiyour and Selmi [2015] who note two distinct phases of BTC returns, and observe a
maturing of the Bitcoin market in recent times.
Insert Table 7 about here
We incorporate these two periods into our existing model by extending equations (3) and (5) as
follows, where I1 and I2 are indicator variables, taking a value 0 or 1, relative to the appropriate
period of our sample.
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Results for periods I and II are presented in Table 5. With the exception of idiosyncratic,
all other forms of volatility spillovers decreased to a lower level in Period 2. The second stage
GARCH estimation indicates that the percentage exposure of assets to global systematic volatility
spillovers decreased from 31.7% in Period 1 to 17.1% in Period 2, while the number of assets
exposed to shift spillovers decreased from 46.3% to 31.7%. This decrease in both systematic and
shift spillovers suggests that digital assets become less exposed to such forms, as they mature. We
observe an increase in market capitalisation across all digital assets, throughout our sample period
(as illustrated in Figure 2), suggesting that this increase contributes to the reduction in systematic
and shift volatility spillover exposure. Volatility spillovers exposure experienced a small decrease
from 58.5% to 56%. Volatility spillovers remains the most dominant and frequent form of volatility
spillovers exposure in both Periods 1 and 2. The relatively small change across periods suggests that
levels of volatility spillovers exposure remain constant as asset size increases. Only idiosyncratic
spillovers experience an increase between periods, with 39% of assets displaying evidence of exposure
to such volatility spillovers in Period 2 representing an increase from 29.2% in Period 1. This
observed increase indicating that increases in the market capitalisation of digital assets correspond
with an increase in levels of idiosyncratic volatility spillover exposure.
7. Conclusions
Our findings are consistent with our previous, theoretical, discussion on the existence of tradi-
tional volatility spillover channels between broad financial markets and the new digital asset class
containing cryptocurrencies (Corbet et al. [2018]). Our primary observation is that digital assets do
not in fact, react in an identical manner, and so, should not be viewed as one category or market.
Currencies appear linked to the FIAT market, and remain connected (at least in a statistical sense),
to the policy making decisions of traditional FIAT banks (Federal Reserve). While we isolated cur-
rencies from the rest of the application layer, we observe other forms of application to display a
similar reaction. Our most significant finding however, is the observation that protocol based assets
display evidence of a completely different reaction, in some cases moving in an opposite direction
to currency based applications. Such findings confirm our previous proposition, and warrant digital
assets to be evaluated based on their use, and place, within the blockchain stack rather than viewed
as a single entity within the cryptocurrency market.
In the previously examined Internet stack, underlying web protocols were not accessible to
investors, leaving only the top application layer as an avenue to create wealth. This model has
changed with the advent of blockchain technology, and as a result, wealth will indeed be created in
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the lowest level of the stack. As such, these underlying protocols should be viewed as almost a new
form of financial asset, one that cannot be compared with previous instruments, and our findings,
the observation of their reaction to traditional FIAT markets and monetary policy announcements,
confirm this to be the case. Application layer ICOs are being used as an alternative method to
raise capital for projects, which in some cases are still at a concept stage, rather than utilising
traditional venture capital funding routes. ICOs are being used to crowd-source funding, and in
many cases, the process has been abused. The rapid growth of such ICOs present evidence of one of
the traditional hallmarks of a bubble. If all assets and cryptocurrencies are viewed in this manner,
it follows that the entire market would be subject to the effects of a bubble. Zeira [1999] offered an
explanation for this through development of the hypothesis of ‘informational overshooting’, where
bubbles are largely explained due to informational dynamics. This appears to be a explanation
that is largely applicable to this rapidly developing market. As we have demonstrated, these
blockchain applications are simply thin layer applications, built upon the protocols themselves.
Once we differentiate between these two classes of digital assets, it becomes possible to consider
these applications to be overvalued and in the midst of a bubble, whilst viewing protocols as entirely
separate entities, indeed entities that could retain value despite a potential market crash that may
occur among application layer tokens.
Bibliography
Akyildirim, E., S. Corbet, P. Katsiampa, N. Kellard, and A. Sensoy (2019). The development of
bitcoin futures: Exploring the interactions between cryptocurrency derivatives. Finance Research
Letters Article in Press.
Akyildirim, E., S. Corbet, B. Lucey, A. Sensoy, and L. Yarovaya (2019). The relationship between
implied volatility and cryptocurrency returns. Finance Research Letters Article in Press.
Andersen, T. G. and T. Bollerslev (1997). Heterogeneous Information Arrivals and Return Volatility
Dynamics: Uncovering the Long-Run in High Frequency Returns. The Journal of Finance 52 (3),
975–1005.
Bariviera, A. F., M. J. Basgall, W. Hasperué, and M. Naiouf (2017). Some stylized facts of the
Bitcoin market. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 484, 82–90.
Berger, A. and C. Bouwman (2017). Bank liquidity creation, monetary policy, and financial crises.
Journal of Financial Stability 30, 139–155.
Böhme, R., N. Christin, B. Edelman, and T. Moore (2015). Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and
Governance. Journal of Economic Perspectives 29 (2), 213–238.
Bouoiyour, J. and R. Selmi (2015). What does Bitcoin look like? Annals of Economics and
Finance 16 (2), 449–492.
Bouoiyour, J. and R. Selmi (2016). Bitcoin: A beginning of a new phase? Economics Bulletin 36 (3),
1430–1440.
Brandvold, M., P. Molnár, K. Vagstad, and O. C. Andreas Valstad (2015). Price discovery on
Bitcoin exchanges. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 36, 18–
35.
16
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073727 
Celeste, V., S. Corbet, and C. Gurdgiev (2019). Fractal dynamics and wavelet analysis: Deep
volatility and return properties of bitcoin, ethereum and ripple. Quarterly Review of Economics
and Finance.
Cheah, E. T. and J. Fry (2015). Speculative bubbles in Bitcoin markets? An empirical investigation
into the fundamental value of Bitcoin. Economics Letters 130, 32–36.
Cheung, A. W. K., E. Roca, and J. J. Su (2015). Crypto-currency bubbles: an application of the
Phillips, Shi and Yu (2013) methodology on Mt. Gox bitcoin prices. Applied Economics 47 (23),
2348–2358.
Christopoulos, A. and R. Jarrow (2018). Cmbs market efficiency: The crisis and the recovery.
Journal of Financial Stability 36, 159–186.
Claessens, S., G. Dell’Ariccia, D. Igan, and L. Laeven (2010). Cross-country experiences and policy
implications from the global financial crisis. Economic Policy 25 (62), 267–293.
Corbet, S., V. Eraslan, B. M. Lucey, and A. Sensoy (2019). The effectiveness of technical trading
rules in cryptocurrency markets. Finance Research Letters 31, 32–37.
Corbet, S. and C. Larkin (2017). Has the uniformity of banking regulation within the European
Union restricted rather than encouraged sectoral development? International Review of Financial
Analysis 53, 48-65.
Corbet, S., B. Lucey, A. Urquhart, and L. Yarovaya (2019). Cryptocurrencies as a financial asset:
A systematic analysis. International Review of Financial Analysis 62, 182–199.
Corbet, S., B. Lucey, and L. Yarovaya (2018). Datestamping the bitcoin and ethereum bubbles.
Finance Research Letters 26, 81–88.
Corbet, S., A. Meegan, C. Larkin, B. Lucey, and L. Yarovaya (2018). Exploring the dynamic
relationships between cryptocurrencies and other financial assets. Economics Letters 165, 28–34.
Dungey, M. and D. Gajurel (2015). Contagion and banking crisis - International evidence for
2007-2009. Journal of Banking and Finance 60, 271–283.
Dwyer, G. P. (2015). The economics of Bitcoin and similar private digital currencies. Journal of
Financial Stability 17, 81–91.
Edwards, S. (1998). Interest Rate Volatility, Capital Controls, and Contagion. National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 6756.
Eken, M. H. and E. Baloglu (2017). Crypto currencies and their destinies in the future. Journal of
Finance & Banking Studies 6 (4), 1–11.
Engle, R. F., T. Ito, W. L. Lin, and W. L. Lin (1990). Meteor showers or heat waves? Heteroskedas-
tic intra-daily volatility in the foreign exchange market. Econometrica 58 (3), 525–542.
Forbes, K. J. and R. Rigobon (2002). No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock
Market Comovements. The Journal of Finance 57 (5), 2223–2261.
17
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073727 
Fry, J. (2018). Booms, busts and heavy-tails: The story of bitcoin and cryptocurrency markets?
Economics Letters 171, 225–229.
Fry, J. and E. T. Cheah (2016). Negative bubbles and shocks in cryptocurrency markets. Interna-
tional Review of Financial Analysis 47, 343–352.
Gandal, N., J. Hamrick, T. Moore, and T. Oberman (2018). Price manipulation in the Bitcoin
ecosystem. Journal of Monetary Economics 95, 86–96.
Gertler, P. and R. Horvath (2018). Central bank communication and financial markets: New
high-frequency evidence. Journal of Financial Stability 36, 336–345.
Gronwald, M. (2014). The economics of Bitcoin: Market characteristics and price jumps. CESifo
Working Paper (5121).
Katsiampa, P., S. Corbet, and B. Lucey (2019a). High frequency volatility co-movements in cryp-
tocurrency markets. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 62,
35–52.
Katsiampa, P., S. Corbet, and B. Lucey (2019b). Volatility spillover effects in leading cryptocur-
rencies: A BEKK-MGARCH analysis. Finance Research Letters, 29, 68–74.
Krainer, R. (2017). Economic stability under alternative banking systems: Theory and policy.
Journal of Financial Stability 31, 107–118.
Kroll, J., I. Davey, and E. Felten (2013). The Economics of Bitcoin Mining, or Bitcoin in the
Presence of Adversaries. The Twelfth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS
2013) (WEIS), 1–21.
Masson, P. (1999). Contagion: macroeconomic models with multiple equilibria. Journal of Inter-
national Money and Finance 18, 587–602.
Mester, L. (2017). The nexus of macroprudential supervision, monetary policy, and financial sta-
bility. Journal of Financial Stability 30, 177–180.
Nadarajah, S. and J. Chu (2017). On the inefficiency of Bitcoin. Economics Letters 150, 6–9.
Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. Available at:
www.bitcoin.org , 9.
Phillips, P. C., S. Shi, and J. Yu (2015). Testing for multiple bubbles: Historical episodes of
exuberance and collapse in the S&P 500. International Economic Review 56 (4), 1043–1078.
Risteski, D. and D. Davcev (2014). Can we use daily internet search query data to improve predicting
power of egarch models for financial time series volatility. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems (ICSIS-2014), October 17–18, 2014,
Dubai (United Arab Emirates).
Sensoy, A. (2019). The inefficiency of Bitcoin revisited: A high-frequency analysis with alternative
currencies. Finance Research Letters, 28, 68–73.
Urquhart, A. (2017). Price clustering in Bitcoin. Economics Letters 159, 145–148.
18
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073727 
Yoldas, E. and Z. Senyuz (2018). Financial stress and equilibrium dynamics in term interbank
funding markets. Journal of Financial Stability 34, 136–149.
Zeira, J. (1999). Informational overshooting, booms, and crashes. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 43 (1), 237–257.
19
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073727 
Figure 1: An illustration of the TCP/IP internet stack and suggested blockchain stack
Note: The above figure contains a number of examples of internet protocols including: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP), the underlying protocol of the World Wide Web defining how messages are formatted and transmitted,
HTTP Secure (HTTPS), a communications protocol used for secure communication over networks, and Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL), a communications security protocol commonly used in email. Unlike Currencies, protocols are
digital assets whose primary function will be that of data transfer, and provide a bottom layer on which to build
decentralised applications. When categorising the digital assets in our sample, we include any platform, blockchain
or method for data transfer, upon which other applications could feasibly be built, in our definition of the term
‘protocol". Decentralised Applications (dApps) refers to any application whose back-end code runs on a
decentralised peer-to-peer network. This contrasts with traditional applications, whose back-end code is usually
executed on a centralised server. dApps typically consist of front-end code and user interfaces written in a
traditional programming language, and back-end code executed on a blockchain - typically in the form of smart
contracts.
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Table 1: Sample of digital assets included in this analysis
Ticker Name Ticker Name Ticker Name
BTC Bitcoin DCR Decred PPY Peerplays
ETH Ethereum KMD Komodo LBC LBRY Credits
XRP Ripple DGB DigiByte NMC Namecoin
LTC Litecoin DGD DigixDAO QRL Quantum Re-
sistant Ledger
ETC Ethereum Classic NXT Nxt WINGS Wings
XEM NEM BAT Basic Attention Token AMP Synereo
DASH Dash PIVX PIVX BAY BitBay
MIOTA IOTA 1ST FirstBlood STORJ Storj
BTS BitShares BNT Bancor MONA MonaCoin
XMR Monero SNGLS SingularDTV CLOAK CloakCoin
STRAT Stratis MGO MobileGo VSL vSlice
EOS EOS MCAP MCAP XCP Counterparty
ZEC Zcash BTCD BitcoinDark XEL Elastic
WAVES Waves SYS SysCoin BLK BlackCoin
STEEM Steem FUN FunFair NLG Gulden
ANS AntShares ANT Aragon OBITS OBITS
BCN Bytecoin NXS Nexus XAUR Xaurum
GNT Golem XAS Asch VIA Viacoin
VERI Veritaseum UBQ Ubiq OMNI Omni
SC Siacoin LKK Lykke XZC Zcoin
BCC BitConnect PPC Peercoin BURST Burst
GNO Gnosis EMC Emercoin HMQ Humaniq
ICN Iconomi ARK Ark VTC Vertcoin
REP Augur ROUND Round SLS Salus
LSK Lisk EDG Edgeless MYST Mysterium
XLM Stellar Lumens LEO LEOcoin BLOCK Blocknet
DOGE Dogecoin RDD ReddCoin X AGRS Agoras Tokens
GBYTE Byteball SJCX Storjcoin YBC YbCoin
MAID MaidSafeCoin NMR Numeraire EAC EarthCoin
GAME GameCredits DICE Etheroll NAV NAV Coin
FCT Factom RLC iExec RLC GRC GridCoin
USDT Tether XVG Verge TKN TokenCard
ARDR Ardor MLN Melon QAU Quantum
SNT Status
Note: Digital Assets sample consisting of Top 100 digital assets by market capitalisation on June 15th,
2017. Only assets with more than 90 daily observations were included in the final sample. Data sourced
from www.coinmarketcap.com.
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Figure 2: GARCH-calculated volatility distributed by market capitalisation and type of cryptocurrency
Note: The top figure represents the entire sample of cryptocurrencies. The centre figure divides the
sample into those cryptocurrencies denoted as mineable and non-mineable. The bottom figure divides the
sample into those cryptocurrencies denotes as a currency, a protocol or a dApp. The vertical axes in all
three figures represents the log of the crytocurrency’s market capitalisation, whereas the horizontal axes
represents the GARCH-calculated volatility.
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Table 2: FOMC Policy Announcements
Date Type Change New Level
15 June 2017 Fed Fund Rate +0.25% 1.00% to 1.25%
16 March 2017 Fed Fund Rate +0.25% 0.75% - 1.00%
15 December 2016 Fed Fund Rate +0.25% 0.50% - 0.75%
17 December 2015 Fed Fund Rate +0.25% 0.25% - 0.50%
29 October 2014 QE3 End End 0%
18 December 2013 QE3 Taper -$10 Billion/month $80 Billion/Month
19 June 2013 QE (May Scale Back Event) - -
22 May 2013 QE (Taper Tantrum) - -
Note: FOMC Federal Fund target rate and QE policy announcements from 2013 - 2017
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Table 3: GARCH Methodology Selection Criteria
Model GARCH EGARCH TGARCH GJR-GARCH Best Identified Methodology
Crypto AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
AGRS -327.878 -312.984 -367.418 -348.801 -358.285 -339.667 -353.145 -334.528 EGARCH EGARCH
ANS -184.180 -170.986 -211.898 -195.196 -205.945 -189.453 -204.137 -187.645 EGARCH EGARCH
BAY -884.417 -862.017 -914.274 -905.314 -895.572 -868.692 -887.833 -860.952 EGARCH EGARCH
nBCN -698.131 -674.984 -773.729 -755.769 -772.859 -745.083 -749.609 -721.833 EGARCH EGARCH
BLOCK -373.892 -351.423 -376.977 -350.015 -374.568 -347.605 -277.386 -259.609 EGARCH GARCH
BTC -3,597.725 -3,577.945 -3,687.721 -3,682.776 -3,600.457 -3,575.731 -3,608.627 -3,583.902 EGARCH EGARCH
BTCC -128.260 -109.850 -442.153 -419.140 -243.205 -220.192 -242.834 -224.601 EGARCH EGARCH
BTS -1,694.991 -1,671.999 -1,790.792 -1,723.201 -1,748.595 -1,721.004 -1,783.014 -1,755.423 EGARCH GJR-GARCH
BURST -938.483 -915.699 -1,062.014 -1,052.901 -984.423 -957.083 -999.782 -972.442 EGARCH EGARCH
CLOAK -25.700 -2.514 -103.814 -94.540 4.474 32.298 -53.973 -26.150 EGARCH EGARCH
DASH -1,858.894 -1,835.215 -1,876.893 -1,848.478 -1,861.448 -1,833.033 -1,870.142 -1,841.727 EGARCH EGARCH
DCR -585.422 -566.161 -588.274 -565.161 -584.196 -561.083 -587.028 -565.915 EGARCH GARCH
DGB -939.185 -915.470 -988.410 -978.924 -688.779 -660.322 -983.925 -1,005.467 EGARCH GJR-GARCH
DGD -597.759 -579.223 -597.838 -580.424 -551.139 -528.896 -594.911 -572.668 EGARCH EGARCH
DOGE -2,334.148 -2,310.237 -2,346.076 -2,317.383 -2,341.622 -2,312.929 -2,227.610 -2,208.629 EGARCH EGARCH
EAC -1,020.506 -996.646 -1,214.286 -1,204.742 -1,028.639 -1,000.007 -1,044.429 -1,015.797 EGARCH EGARCH
EMC -649.228 -627.743 -688.824 -680.230 -657.328 -631.545 -678.849 -653.067 EGARCH EGARCH
ETC -329.801 -312.546 -296.626 -275.920 -378.996 -358.290 -384.465 -363.759 GJR-GARCH GJR-GARCH
ETH -871.243 -850.448 -909.305 -884.350 -877.852 -852.897 -908.754 -883.799 EGARCH EGARCH
FCT -535.104 -514.762 -407.238 -382.827 -79.926 -71.790 -581.111 -556.701 GJR-GARCH GJR-GARCH
GAME -468.673 -446.413 -477.974 -451.262 -470.109 -443.396 -406.594 -388.993 EGARCH EGARCH
ICN -186.043 -169.942 -179.888 -160.566 -184.121 -164.799 -162.315 -150.193 GARCH GARCH
LBC -144.019 -126.513 -162.117 -141.109 -147.549 -126.541 -150.057 -129.049 EGARCH EGARCH
LEO -717.917 -697.090 -721.559 -696.567 -650.325 -633.942 -719.892 -694.899 EGARCH GARCH
LSK -534.411 -515.745 -529.384 -506.984 -532.894 -510.494 -530.803 -508.403 GARCH GARCH
LTC -3,402.561 -3,377.835 -3,604.928 -3,595.038 -3,410.770 -3,381.100 -3,423.087 -3,393.417 EGARCH EGARCH
MAID -1,799.733 -1,776.361 -1,806.999 -1,778.952 -1,801.393 -1,773.346 -1,798.922 -1,770.875 EGARCH EGARCH
MONA -1,633.403 -1,605.861 -1,638.937 -1,615.985 -1,583.449 -1,555.907 -1,632.188 -1,604.646 EGARCH EGARCH
NLG -1,275.923 -1,252.462 -1,374.767 -1,365.382 -1,280.800 -1,252.647 -1,318.722 -1,290.569 EGARCH EGARCH
NMC -2,698.968 -2,674.243 -2,759.274 -2,749.384 -2,697.461 -2,667.790 -2,725.263 -2,695.592 EGARCH EGARCH
NXS -529.152 -507.648 -540.762 -514.958 -529.177 -503.372 -534.560 -508.756 EGARCH EGARCH
NXT -1,697.809 -1,673.853 -1,832.077 -1,822.495 -1,762.519 -1,733.771 -2,180.471 -2,161.452 GJR-GARCH GJR-GARCH
PIVX -145.910 -126.692 -211.764 -204.077 -139.364 -116.303 -178.295 -155.234 EGARCH EGARCH
PPC -2,671.355 -2,647.010 -2,686.806 -2,657.592 -2,684.418 -2,655.204 -2,493.824 -2,474.483 EGARCH EGARCH
RDD -448.755 -425.124 -458.471 -430.114 -485.698 -457.341 -460.028 -431.671 TGARCH TGARCH
REP -371.617 -354.810 -375.442 -368.720 -331.324 -311.156 -366.518 -346.350 EGARCH EGARCH
SC -540.398 -520.776 -560.006 -536.461 -479.239 -471.390 -564.307 -540.762 GJR-GARCH GJR-GARCH
SJCX -1,021.397 -998.577 -1,136.430 -1,109.047 -1,039.853 -1,012.469 -1,083.176 -1,065.106 EGARCH EGARCH
ST -249.799 -240.669 -289.562 -283.100 -270.407 -251.020 -267.324 -247.937 EGARCH EGARCH
STEEM -133.665 -115.130 -177.852 -160.438 -160.472 -138.229 -176.179 -153.936 EGARCH EGARCH
SYS -846.794 -823.954 -857.537 -830.128 -871.311 -843.903 -720.243 -702.154 TGARCH TGARCH
VIA -749.818 -726.819 -767.519 -739.920 -756.064 -728.465 -1,093.856 -1,075.634 GJR-GARCH GJR-GARCH
VTC -1,319.072 -1,295.287 -1,319.163 -1,309.649 -929.248 -900.707 -1,261.339 -1,242.463 EGARCH EGARCH
WAVES -497.608 -479.634 -498.465 -476.897 -496.525 -474.957 -490.515 -468.946 EGARCH GARCH
XAUR -567.987 -546.446 -585.792 -577.176 -566.110 -540.261 -520.192 -494.344 EGARCH EGARCH
XCP -1,407.215 -1,383.566 -1,435.214 -1,406.835 -1,432.043 -1,403.664 -1,431.282 -1,402.903 EGARCH EGARCH
XEM -724.322 -702.655 -823.300 -797.300 -726.151 -700.152 -799.712 -773.713 EGARCH EGARCH
XLM -1,644.687 -1,621.770 -1,745.599 -1,718.099 -1,679.719 -1,652.219 -1,708.615 -1,681.115 EGARCH EGARCH
XMR -1,609.105 -1,585.910 -1,681.937 -1,656.105 -1,454.409 -1,426.577 -1,683.441 -1,655.610 GJR-GARCH EGARCH
XRP -2,554.636 -2,530.239 -2,698.560 -2,688.802 -2,556.010 -2,526.734 -2,539.130 -2,509.854 EGARCH EGARCH
XVG 269.130 282.486 132.771 159.779 401.974 428.982 212.235 239.242 EGARCH EGARCH
YBC -2,364.157 -2,340.360 -2,447.559 -2,419.003 -2,370.580 -2,342.025 -2,382.302 -2,353.747 EGARCH EGARCH
ZEC -218.057 -202.528 -298.075 -279.440 -202.928 -184.293 -228.292 -209.656 EGARCH EGARCH
Note: We considered the use of GARCH, Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) and GJR-GARCH, but EGARCH was found to
outperform each methodology. Results are available from the authors on request. An intercept and a deterministic trend
were included in the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron (PP) models. The trend was included to capture
the reduction in average volatility that took place during the period prior to the inclusion of CFDs. The ADF model tests
whether the equity series contain a unit root in order to correct for serial correlation. PP tests employ a non-parametric
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix with d truncation lags. The models test down by sequentially removing the
last lag until a significant lag is reached giving the order of augmentation for the ADF test that minimised the Akaike
information criterion. The results indicated rejected of the null-unit root hypotheses at a minimum of the 5 per cent level.
Where necessary, we display the results of the best-fitting methodology as determined by the selection criteria. Further
results for all methodological calculations are available from the authors on request.
24
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073727 
Table 4: Parameter results based on cryptocurrency volatility spillover effects before the investigated monetary policy announcements
Asset Category Mineable b2 b4 b5 π2 b2 = b4 = 0 b2 = π2 = 0 b4 = π2 = 0 b2 = b4 = π2 = 0
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Volatility Spillovers
BTC Currency Yes -0.755 0.505*** 0.000*** 0.507 30.59*** 3.74 72.83*** 68.51***
DASH Currency Yes -0.177 0.098*** 0.003* 0.416 14.82*** 2.06 56.90*** 68.89***
DCR Currency Yes -0.277 0.089*** 0.004** 0.316*** 5.13** 0.42 3.01* 4.27**
DOGE Currency Yes 0.128 0.087*** -0.004*** 0.444* 4.56*** 2.32 7.54*** 7.78***
EMC Protocol Yes -0.371 0.706*** 0.001*** -1.012 3.27* 1.10 5.94*** 6.30***
ICN dApp No -0.107 0.831** -0.001** -0.091** 4.94** 1.70 8.94*** 6.63***
LBC dApp Yes 0.829 0.192*** 0.030*** 0.813** 3.09** 0.01 4.59** 7.99**
LTC Currency Yes -0.149 0.122*** -0.001* -0.258 7.29*** 1.12 21.52*** 26.43***
NXS Currency Yes -0.581 0.563** -0.001*** -0.754*** 3.49** 1.55 5.97*** 10.05***
PPC Currency Yes -0.239* 1.013*** 0.003*** -0.714 7.17*** 1.73 10.81*** 12.54***
Panel B: Multiple Drivers of Volatility Spillovers
ANS Protocol No -0.124*** 0.149 0.002 -0.495* 24.47*** 21.55*** 12.78*** 43.88***
BCN Currency Yes 0.107** -0.054** -0.004** 0.186*** 5.48*** 4.62*** 12.43*** 30.22***
BTCD Currency Yes 0.102*** 0.286*** -0.003*** 0.832*** 10.66*** 17.68*** 13.91*** 21.38***
BURST Currency Yes 0.115*** 1.063*** 0.004*** 0.181* 18.21*** 20.55*** 34.34*** 41.89***
ETH Protocol Yes -0.606*** -0.323** 0.003*** 0.491** 7.98*** 10.61*** 45.18*** 60.78***
LEO Currency Yes 1.054*** 0.163** -0.002*** -0.298*** 42.75*** 45.95*** 53.48*** 127.25***
MONA Currency Yes 0.615*** 0.563 0.001*** 0.233 15.07*** 17.04*** 41.09*** 68.46***
NXT Protocol No -0.046*** 0.094*** 0.001* 0.129*** 11.14*** 8.46*** 17.27*** 26.63***
STRAT Protocol No -0.144*** 0.127*** -0.001 -0.167* 9.06*** 7.35** 22.45*** 34.53***
ZEC Currency Yes 0.129 0.052*** 0.001 -0.354*** 3.22* 3.22** 3.32** 3.65***
Panel C: Systematic Volatility Spillovers
AGRS Protocol No -0.353 0.913*** 0.004 0.251* 3.37** 4.22* 0.83 5.44*
NLG Currency Yes -0.272 0.916*** 0.006 -0.941 9.23*** 15.26*** 0.49 15.76***
RDD Currency No 2.053*** -0.238 -0.001 0.389 30.62*** 27.02*** 0.74 71.58***
XAUR Currency No -0.408 0.174*** -0.003 -0.181 4.33* 33.26*** 0.84 39.17***
XLM Currency No 0.289** 0.045*** 0.003 0.303* 4.16* 4.77** 1.80 7.06**
Panel D: Volatility Driven Spillovers
CLOAK Currency No 0.533 0.471 -0.004 -0.943*** 0.43 7.23** 13.14*** 14.06***
EAC Currency Yes 0.325 0.883*** -0.002** 0.181*** 1.24 4.31** 54.98*** 56.31***
SYS Protocol Yes 0.261 0.915*** 0.001* 0.348** 0.24 4.29** 7.88*** 7.95**
XEM Protocol No 0.834 0.105 0.004 0.164*** 1.59 3.14** 3.18* 5.21*
Note: The values for b2, b3, b4, b5 and π2 are the parameter estimates and values for joint test are the Chi-square values. For brevity, we have not
presented the results of methodologies that did not present significant results. These results are available on request. Tests of π2(20) and π2(30) were
used as a robustness check for the decision to avail of a 50-day dummy variable window. ***, **, and * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% respectively.
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Table 5: Grouping Parameter Results: Currency, Protocol, dApp
Asset b2 b4 b5 π2 b2 = b4 = 0 b2 = π2 = 0 b4 = π2 = 0 b2 = b4 = π2 = 0 Spillover Type
Currency -0.298 0.176*** 0.001*** 1.046*** 9.83*** 2.12 7.15*** 7.49*** Idiosyncratic
dApp -0.217 0.307*** 0.001*** -0.397*** 0.54 0.61 1.19 1.63 None
Protocol -0.280 0.137 0.001** 0.062* 0.84 0.79 0.32 1.31 None
Note: The above table presents the parameter estimates indicating the effects of US policy announcements on 58 digital assets. The sample is sorted into three
cohorts, Currency, Protocol and dApp, based on the descriptions in Section 3. Coefficients b2,b4 and b5 represent additional global systematic risk exposure
during the announcement period (systematic volatility spillovers), additional US shocks during announcement period (idiosyncratic volatility spillovers) and
intercept shift (shift volatility spillovers), respectively. π2 represents additional US volatility spillovers during the announcement period (volatility driven
spillovers). ***, **, and * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Table 6: Grouping Parameter Results: Mineable, Non-Mineable
Asset b2 b4 b5 π2 b2 = b4 = 0 b2 = π2 = 0 b4 = π2 = 0 b2 = b4 = π2 = 0 Spillover Type
Yes -1.087 0.114** 0.000*** 1.956*** 14.46*** 39.00*** 62.99*** 63.12*** Multiple
No -0.334 -0.068 0.002*** 0.203*** 3.62 26.54*** 31.07*** 31.96*** Volatility Driven
Note: The above table presents the parameter estimates indicating the effects of US policy announcements on 58 digital assets. The sample is sorted into three
cohorts, Currency, Protocol and dApp, based on the descriptions in Section 3. Coefficients b2,b4 and b5 represent additional global systematic risk exposure
during the announcement period (systematic volatility spillovers), additional US shocks during announcement period (idiosyncratic volatility spillovers) and
intercept shift (shift volatility spillovers), respectively. π2 represents additional US volatility spillovers during the announcement period (volatility driven
spillovers). ***, **, and * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 7: Cryptocurrency volatility spillovers based on two phases: QE (2013-2014) and Interest Rates (2015-2016)
Asset b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 π1 π2 π3
AGRS 0.426* - -0.424 - 0.031 -0.014*** - -0.021***
ANS 1.020*** - -0.895*** - 0.018** 0.023* - 0.003
BAY 0.759*** -0.143 -0.419* -0.009 0.004*** 0.021*** -0.002** 0.008*
BCN 0.860*** -0.205 0.282 -0.001 -0.005 -0.028 -0.004 0.006***
BLOCK 0.827*** -0.441 0.307 0.010 0.002 -0.008 -0.014*** 0.003
BTC1 0.151** 0.632 0.322 -0.003 0.007 0.062 -0.021* 0.015**
BTCD 0.830*** 0.213 0.254*** 0.023*** -0.067*** 0.031* 0.014 -0.004***
BTS 0.318*** 0.191* 0.437* -0.011** 0.013 0.011*** -0.008 0.014***
BURST 0.907*** 0.232 -0.183 0.057*** 0.032*** 0.010*** 0.009** -0.002**
CLOAK 0.712*** -0.160 -0.526 0.001 -0.015 0.019*** -0.025*** -0.002
DASH 0.343*** 0.536*** 0.495** 0.007 0.009 0.167** 0.005 0.012
DCR 0.707*** 0.580 -0.311 0.062* 0.020 0.040 0.008** 0.005
DGB 0.651*** 0.524*** -0.445* 0.064*** 0.009 0.027 0.007 0.016
DGD 0.843*** - -0.205 - -0.010 0.013*** - -0.011*
DOGE 0.637*** 0.232*** -0.232*** 0.005 -0.001 0.028*** 0.011*** -0.003*
EAC 0.614*** 0.801*** -0.461** -0.014* 0.021** 0.033*** -0.006*** 0.005***
EMC 0.782*** -0.643 -0.073 0.002 0.009 0.033*** -0.006 -0.003
ETC 0.431* - 0.196 - 0.001 0.062*** - -0.003**
ETH 0.532*** -0.464 -0.096 0.028* 0.011 0.021*** 0.003*** -0.002
FCT 0.364* -0.065 0.620* 0.002 0.003 0.014*** 0.010*** -0.013***
GAME 0.717*** -0.954*** -0.086 0.033** -0.004 0.017** 0.014*** -0.002*
ICN 0.401*** - 0.019 - 0.002 0.045** - -0.003***
LBC 0.529 - 0.201 - 0.005 0.052*** - -0.005**
LEO 0.388*** -0.397 -0.215 -0.010 -0.013** 0.023*** 0.009 -0.004***
LSK 0.225* - 0.313** - 0.014* 0.023** - -0.003
LTC 0.964*** -0.042 -0.323* -0.001 0.007 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.004***
MAID 0.703*** 0.448*** 0.334* 0.029*** 0.014 0.013*** -0.002 -0.004
MONA 0.177*** 0.444*** 0.221* 0.003 0.013* -0.011** 0.004*** 0.002**
NLG 0.792*** 0.126 -0.209 0.005 0.005 0.018*** -0.016 0.006
NMC 0.730*** 0.221*** 0.265 0.009*** 0.014* 0.012*** -0.004 0.015
NXS 0.118*** -0.785 -0.704 -0.011 0.001 0.090*** 0.008 -0.013*
NXT 0.843*** 0.123 -0.133* -0.029*** 0.001 0.004* 0.005*** -0.002
PIVX 0.923*** -0.122 -0.132*** 0.074 0.047** 0.024*** 0.011*** -0.004***
PPC 0.913*** 0.082 -0.154 0.004 0.007 0.012*** 0.005** 0.005*
RDD 0.678*** 0.365 -0.223 -0.002 0.004 0.028*** -0.008*** 0.007***
REP 0.668*** - 0.017 - 0.017 0.028*** - -0.003***
SC 0.105*** -0.125 0.152 0.088*** 0.017* 0.017*** -0.005*** 0.007*
SJCX 0.764*** -0.273* -0.371* 0.075*** 0.011 0.038*** -0.021*** -0.004***
ST 0.495** - -0.101*** - -0.008 -0.011 - 0.004
STEEM -0.124*** - 0.187*** - 0.023* 0.098** - 0.027***
SYS 0.917*** 0.069 -0.185 0.015* 0.008 0.031 0.012 0.004
VIA 0.785*** 0.187 -0.379 0.007 0.028** -0.035*** 0.023** 0.003*
VTC 0.772*** 0.179 0.544 -0.032*** 0.083*** 0.096 0.010 0.023
WAVES 1.444*** - -0.681** - 0.001 0.028*** - -0.012**
XAUR 0.531* 0.652 0.578 -0.010* -0.016 -0.007 -0.015* 0.127
XCP 0.713*** 0.095 0.277 -0.022 0.005 -0.149* 0.008*** 0.015***
XEM 0.986*** 0.245*** -0.181 -0.040** 0.016* 0.035*** 0.024** 0.004*
XLM 0.484*** -0.089 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.003 -0.004 0.007
XMR 0.941*** 0.082 -0.303 0.005 0.006 0.16*** -0.004 -0.006
XRP 0.440*** 0.042 -0.115 0.008* -0.001 0.011*** -0.004 -0.003***
XVG 0.204*** -0.115 -0.153* 0.032 0.018 0.028*** -0.003*** -0.004***
YBC 0.243*** 0.456*** 0.198*** 0.025*** -0.007*** 0.018*** 0.005 0.003
ZEC 0.824* - -0.076 - -0.004 0.006*** - -0.005***
Note: The above table presents the parameter results indicating the effects of US Policy announcements on 58 digital
assets, based on 2 separate phases. For brevity, we have not presented the results of methodologies that did not present
significant results. These results are available on request. The coefficients b2 and b3 represent additional global systematic
risk exposure during each respective phase of announcement (systematic volatility spillovers). b4 represents additional US
shocks over the entire sample period. b5 and b6 represent additional US shocks during each respective phase (idiosyncratic
volatility spillovers). b7 and b8 represent intercept shift (shift volatility spillovers) during each respective phase. π1
represents US volatility spillover, during the entire sample period. π2 and π3 represent the additional US volatility driven
spillovers that occurred during each respective announcement phase. ***, **, and * indicate level of significance at 1%,
5%, and 10% respectively.
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